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Does Retrieval Enhance Suggestibility Because It Increases Perceived
Credibility of the Postevent Information?
Abstract
Despite the robust memory-enhancing benefits of retrieval practice, an initial test can sometimes exacerbate
eyewitness’ susceptibility to subsequent misinformation—a phenomenon known as retrieval-enhanced
suggestibility. One explanation for this finding is that after taking a memory test, participant witnesses are
more likely to treat the subsequently presented misinformation narrative as being credible (the
misinformation acceptance account; e.g., Chan, Manley, & Lang, 2017). Another explanation suggests that
prior testing enhances participants’ ability to learn the post-event misinformation (the test-potentiated
learning account; Chan et al., 2017). In two experiments, we provided a direct test of these alternative
hypotheses and showed that testing did not make participants believe the content of the narrative to be more
accurate, and the perceived accuracy of the narrative was not associated with the likelihood of misinformation
recall. These results are inconsistent with the misinformation acceptance account.
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Does Retrieval Enhance Suggestibility Because It Increases
Perceived Credibility of the Postevent Information?
Krista D. Manley∗, Jason C.K. Chan
Iowa State University, USA
Despite the robust memory-enhancing benefits of retrieval practice, an initial test can sometimes exacerbate eye-
witness’ susceptibility to subsequent misinformation—a phenomenon known as retrieval-enhanced suggestibility.
One explanation for this finding is that after taking a memory test, participant witnesses are more likely to treat the
subsequently presented misinformation narrative as being credible (the misinformation acceptance account; e.g.,
Chan, Manley, & Lang, 2017). Another explanation suggests that prior testing enhances participants’ ability to
learn the post-event misinformation (the test-potentiated learning account; Chan et al., 2017). In two experiments,
we provided a direct test of these alternative hypotheses and showed that testing did not make participants believe
the content of the narrative to be more accurate, and the perceived accuracy of the narrative was not associated
with the likelihood of misinformation recall. These results are inconsistent with the misinformation acceptance
account.
General  Audience  Summary
The accuracy of an eyewitness’s statement is vital to understanding the details of a crime. However, decades
of research have shown that eyewitness memory is prone to error. One way that eyewitness memory might
be influenced is through exposure to post-event misinformation, such as from erroneous news reports or
discussing the events with other witnesses. Further, the effect of post-event misinformation has been shown to
be exacerbated by a preceding initial interview. Here, we tested two theoretical accounts that might explain why
initial interviews can intensify the misinformation effect. One account suggests that witnesses who are initially
interviewed believe in the credibility/accuracy of the post-event misinformation more than witnesses who are
not initially interviewed. These initially interviewed witnesses thus interpret the misinformation as corrective
feedback and adapt it into subsequent reports of the event. The second account posits that initially interviewed
witnesses simply learn all post-event information—including misinformation—better than witnesses who were
not initially interviewed. In two experiments, we showed that initially interviewed individuals did not rate the
post-event information as more credible than individuals who were not initially interviewed. Rather, witnesses
who receive an initial interview report more post-event misinformation than those who do not receive an
initial interview because they learned the misinformation better. Understanding why witnesses might become
susceptible to misinformation is important to informing future research that aims to inoculate witnesses against
this type of error. Consequently, investigators can adjust investigative practices to avoid potential memory
contamination.
Keywords: Eyewitness memory, Retrieval-enhanced suggestibility, Misinformation, Feedback
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Exposure to misinformation can have detrimental effects
on eyewitness memory accuracy (Loftus, 2005; Zaragoza,
Belli, & Payment, 2006). Although one might expect that ask-
ing witnesses to provide an initial statement (i.e., engage in
retrieval practice) might inoculate them against suggestive mis-
information later (Pansky & Tenenboim, 2011), it sometimes
has the opposite effect—a phenomenon known as retrieval-
enhancedsuggestibility  (RES; Chan et al., 2017; Chan, Thomas,
& Bulevich, 2009). In the RES paradigm, participants view a
target event and then receive an initial memory test over that
event (initially tested) or not (nontested). All participants are
exposed to a misinformation narrative later. Lastly, they receive
a final test. The typical finding is that the initially tested partici-
pants recall more misinformation than the nontested participants
on the final test. The purpose of the current study is to investi-
gate the mechanism by which initial testing increases people’s
susceptibility to misinformation.
Several accounts have been proposed to explain RES. The
reconsolidation-disruption account, which is beyond the scope
of the present paper, suggests that initial retrieval destabilizes
memory of the original event, making these original memories
more susceptible to interference from subsequent misinforma-
tion (Chan & LaPaglia, 2013; Chan, Wilford, & Hughes, 2012).
In the present paper, we aimed to investigate two other expla-
nations for RES. One account suggests that retrieval enhances
suggestibility because it promotes encoding of the misinforma-
tion (Chan, Meissner, & Davis, 2018); the other suggests that
retrieval enhances suggestibility because the initial test increases
the likelihood that participants will perceive the post-event nar-
rative as providing credible information.
The idea that testing might promote learning of the sub-
sequent misinformation stems from a phenomenon known as
test-potentiated learning (Chan, Meissner, & Davis, 2018) or the
forward testing effect (Pastotter & Bauml, 2014). According to
this account, prior retrieval exacerbates eyewitness suggestibil-
ity because it promotes learning of the misinformation, thereby
increasing its likelihood of being recalled during the final test
(Chan & LaPaglia, 2011; Chan et al., 2009; Gordon & Thomas,
2014, 2017; Thomas, Bulevich, & Chan, 2010). For exposition
purposes, we refer to this as the test-potentiated learning (TPL)
hypothesis. Although the exact mechanism(s) by which testing
enhances new learning have not yet been ascertained, researchers
have proposed several possibilities (for reviews, see Chan,
Meissner, & Davis, 2018; Yang, Potts, & Shanks, 2018). These
include a resource-based explanation (i.e., retrieval increases the
cognitive resources available for subsequent encoding; Szpunar,
McDermott, & Roediger, 2008), a context-isolation explanation
(i.e., retrieval isolates the prior learning episode from the next;
Jang & Huber, 2008); an integration explanation (i.e., retrieval
enhances binding of original and new information; Wahlheim,
2015), and a metacognitive explanation (i.e., retrieval leads par-
ticipants to optimize their encoding strategy; Chan, Manley,
Davis, & Szpunar, 2018). Regardless of the exact nature by
which initial testing enhances subsequent learning of new infor-
mation, in the context of RES, this TPL account has received
considerable empirical support (e.g., Chan & Langley, 2011;
Gordon & Thomas, 2014, 2017).
An alternative explanation, which is the focus of the present
study, suggests that RES occurs because prior retrieval causes
participants to interpret the misinformation narrative as cor-
rect (Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan & LaPaglia, 2011, 2013;
Rindal, DeFranco, Rich, & Zaragoza, 2016). Consequently,
the tested participants are more likely to discount their own
memory and instead report the information provided in the
postevent narrative. In a review of the RES literature, Chan et al.
(2017) referred to this account as the misinformation  acceptance
hypothesis—a term borrowed from the classic misinformation
effect literature (Belli, 1989), according to which the misinfor-
mation effect occurs because subjects accept and believe that
the misinformation appeared in the witnessed event. In this par-
ticular application of the misinformation acceptance account,
retrieval is hypothesized to increase suggestibility not because
it enhances learning of the misinformation (as suggested by the
TPL account), but because it increases the perceived accuracy
of the misinformation. In a typical misinformation (not RES)
paradigm, participants might wonder why they are presented
with a post-event narrative, and in some cases, they might con-
clude that the narrative provides another chance for them to learn
the target event details—that is, they may accept (at least some
of) the misinformation as truthful. The core assumption of the
misinformation acceptance hypothesis here is that taking a mem-
ory test before the narrative exacerbates  this misinformation
acceptance by making participants believe that the post-event
narrative serves as corrective feedback—similar to how stu-
dents are sometimes provided with feedback following a test.
Although several papers have noted ideas similar to the misin-
formation acceptance hypothesis (Chan & Langley, 2011; Chan
& LaPaglia, 2011, 2013; Chan et al., 2017; Rindal et al., 2016),
none have provided a direct test of its key assumptions.
Contrasting  the  Two  Accounts
Although both the TPL and misinformation acceptance
accounts can predict RES, they reach this prediction based on
different assumptions. According to the misinformation accep-
tance account, testing can increase misinformation recall by
increasing its credibility without enhancing its learning. To illus-
trate, assume that participants are presented with six pieces of
misinformation and all participants, regardless of whether they
are previously tested or not, are able to remember four pieces
of the misinformation (i.e., no TPL). An RES effect can occur
if the tested participants report all four pieces of misinforma-
tion because they believe the narrative to be 100% accurate (i.e.,
4 ×  100% = 4), whereas the nontested participants report only
three pieces of misinformation because they believe the narrative
to be about 70% accurate (i.e., 4 × 70% = 2.8).
Conversely, according to the TPL account, testing can
increase misinformation recall without increasing its credibility.
Assuming again that six pieces of misinformation are presented.
But in this case, testing enhances learning of the misinforma-
tion, with the tested participants learning all six pieces of the
misinformation and the nontested participants learning only four
pieces of the misinformation. Now assume that all participants,
regardless of whether they were tested previously, believed the
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narrative was about 70% correct. In this scenario, the tested
participants would report approximately four pieces of misin-
formation (i.e., 6 ×  70% = 4.2) and the nontested participants
would report three (i.e., 4 ×  70% = 2.8). Consequently, an RES
effect can emerge based purely on TPL, without requiring testing
to increase the credibility of the narrative.
The above examples show how test-potentiated learning and
misinformation acceptance can independently predict RES. It is
possible, however, to conceptualize the two accounts as compli-
mentary rather than competitive. For example, one might suggest
that initial testing increases the perceived credibility of the nar-
rative (e.g., the tested participants might treat the narrative as
corrective feedback), which in turn motivates participants to
attend to the narrative, thereby enhancing its learning. Although
this is a possible reason to suggest that the two accounts can
be combined, it is unparsimonious. Further, ample evidence has
demonstrated that it is not necessary for learners to treat the
post-retrieval information as feedback for retrieval to potentiate
new learning. Indeed, retrieval can promote new learning even if
two learning opportunities feature vastly different, clearly unre-
lated stimuli (Lee & Ahn, 2018; Yang, Chew, Sun, & Shanks,
2019). Consequently, the TPL account is self-sufficient and
does not require an additional mechanism (e.g., misinformation
acceptance) to explain why testing would strengthen learning of
the misinformation. Moreover, regardless of whether the two
accounts are mutually exclusive, a unique prediction of the
misinformation acceptance hypothesis remains: initial testing
should increase the perceived accuracy of the post-event narra-
tive, and this perceived accuracy should drive misinformation
recall.
Overview  of  the  Experiments
In two experiments, we aimed to provide a direct test of the
misinformation acceptance hypothesis and the test-potentiated
learning hypothesis. The experiments followed the typical four-
phase design: (a) participants viewed a target event video; (b)
half of the participants completed an initial recall test whereas
the other half completed a distractor task; (c) participants
listened to a post-event audio narrative that included misinfor-
mation; (d) a final test was administered. Most critically, we
assessed participants’ perceived accuracy of the post-event nar-
rative with a credibility  question, which asked “How accurate
was the information presented in the audio narrative over-
all compared to the video?” According to the misinformation
acceptance account, initial testing should inflate participants’
credibility ratings.
Participants were asked this credibility question either before
or after  the Phase 4 final test. The placement of the narrative cred-
ibility question was manipulated because we were concerned
that this question, when presented prior to the final test, might act
as a subtle warning to participants that the narrative contained
inaccuracies. Thomas et al. (2010) showed that providing an
explicit warning about the credibility of the narrative just before
the final test can eliminate the RES effect. Therefore, asking
participants to provide credibility rating of the narrative might
reduce the magnitude of the RES effect. Despite this possibility,
we felt that it was important to ask participants to assess the
narrative’s credibility immediately following its presentation to
obtain the most valid judgment. To examine whether asking the
credibility question would alter how participants approach the
final test and whether delaying the credibility question would
alter results from this question, we also included a condition
in which participants were asked the credibility question only
after the final test (to prevent participants from inferring that the
narrative might be inaccurate).
The two experiments were identical with one important
exception—we manipulated the type of information participants
were required to retrieve during the final test. In Experiment
1, participants were asked to answer the final test questions
based on what they remembered from the target event—a proce-
dure used in most eyewitness memory studies. In Experiment 2,
however, we asked participants to answer the final test ques-
tions based on what they remembered from the post-event
narrative—a procedure rarely employed in eyewitness stud-
ies (cf. Gordon & Thomas, 2017; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989).
We implemented this manipulation to test the key predictions
from the misinformation acceptance hypothesis. If RES occurs
because prior testing increases the perceived credibility of the
postevent narrative, then the initially tested participants should
rate the narrative as more accurate than the nontested partic-
ipants in both experiments. Moreover, Experiment 1 should
demonstrate an RES effect, with the increased credibility of the
post-event narrative being reflected in an increase in misinfor-
mation recall. In contrast, the RES effect should be eliminated in
Experiment 2, because asking participants to recall details from
the post-event narrative essentially allows all participants to treat
the narrative as “correct,” thereby eliminating any putative dif-
ferences in credibility-based responding between the tested and
nontested participants. In contrast, if RES occurs because ini-
tial testing potentiates learning of the misinformation (instead
of promoting the perceived accuracy of the narrative), then test-
ing should not affect narrative credibility judgments and an RES
effect should be observed in both experiments. The logic is that
RES occurs because testing enhances participants’ learning of
the misinformation, and this enhanced learning of the misinfor-
mation should be evident regardless of whether participants are
asked to recall details from the target event (Experiment 1) or
the narrative (Experiment 2).
Experiment  1
Method
Participants  and  design.  A 2 (initial test: tested, non-
tested) ×  2 (credibility question timing: before final test, after
final test) ×  3 (item type: consistent, neutral, misled) mixed
design was implemented, with initial test and credibility question
timing manipulated between-subjects and item type manipu-
lated within-subjects. Based on past experiments (e.g., Chan
& Langley, 2011; RES d = 0.60), we aimed to collect data from
approximately 36 participants per between-subjects condition.
The sample size was consistent with prior work (e.g., Chan &
Langley, 2011; Chan et al., 2017) and confirmed by a power anal-
ysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009)
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with power set at .80, a one-tailed value of α  = .05, and a medium
effect size of d  = 0.60.
Participants were 166 undergraduate students from Iowa
State University who completed the experiment in exchange for
course credit. The data from 26 participants were not analyzed
because these participants did not possess sufficient English pro-
ficiency. The final sample included data from 140 participants.
There were 68 participants in the tested  condition, 35 of whom
received the narrative credibility question before  the final test
and 33 received it after  the final test. In addition, there were 72
participants in the nontested  condition. Of these, 38 received the
narrative credibility question before  the final test and 34 received
it after  the final test.
Materials  and  procedure.  Participants were seated in front
of computers that were separated by dividers. After receiving
intentional encoding instructions, participants viewed a 43-
minute video depicting a scheme to assassinate a presidential
candidate and a terrorist attack (pilot episode of the television
program “24” used in several previous studies, e.g., Chan et al.,
2009; Thomas et al., 2010) that contained 24 critical details.
Next, participants in the nontested condition completed a cross-
word search for 7 min as a distraction task, whereas participants
in the tested condition took an 18-question initial recall test that
lasted 7 min (1 min to read/listen to the instructions, and 6 min to
answer the questions). Each question queried a different critical
detail (e.g., What  did  the  terrorist  use  to  knock  out  the  flight  atten-
dant? Answer not provided to subjects: Hypodermic  needle).
Participants were told to answer as many questions as possible
but not to guess. They had up to 20 s to answer each question
but could advance to the next question by pressing the “Enter”
key.
After the crossword search/initial test, all participants played
the video game Tetris for 15 min as a distractor task. They then
listened to an 8-minute post-event audio narrative that recapit-
ulated the target event. The 24 critical details were split into
three types of items for the purposes of the narrative. Consistent
items referred to six details that were re-presented correctly in
the narrative (e.g., the terrorist knocks the flight attendant uncon-
scious with a hypodermic needle). Neutral  items  referred to six
details that were omitted from the narrative (e.g., the terrorist
knocks the flight attendant unconscious). Misled  items  referred
to 12 details that were presented incorrectly in the narrative
(e.g., the terrorist knocks the flight attendant unconscious with
a chloroform rag). For the tested participants, six of the misled
items were questioned during the initial test and six were not.
We labeled these latter items as misled-nonquestioned. Inclu-
sion of the misled-nonquestioned items allowed us to examine
whether a within-subjects RES effect has occurred by compar-
ing the misinformation recall probabilities between items that
were questioned during the initial test with items that were not
(similar to Chan et al., 2017). Because the within-subjects RES
effect is tangential to the main objectives of the present study,
we present the results of the misled-nonquestioned items in the
Supplemental Materials. For all other analyses involving the
tested participants, the data from the six misled items that had
been questioned during the initial test were used (as is the case
in virtually all other RES studies to date). Assignment of the 24
critical details to each item type was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. Following the narrative, participants completed brain
teasers (Chan, Meissner, & Davis, 2018) on scratch paper for
15 min. Lastly, all participants took a 24-question final recall
test, with each question targeting one critical detail. As in the
initial test, participants were given 20 s to answer each question
and were not forced to answer. For the final test, participants were
instructed both verbally by the experimenter and through writ-
ten instructions on the computer screen to answer the questions
based on  their  memory  of  the  video.
Of most importance to the present study, participants were
asked to rate their perceived accuracy of the narrative in a
credibility  question  on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning
completely inaccurate and 100 meaning completely accurate.
Specifically, participants were asked, “How accurate was the
information presented in the audio narrative overall compared
to the video?” As stated earlier, half of the participants were
asked this credibility assessment question just before the final
test, and half were asked this question after the final test. To
be clear, we did not expect participants to provide very low
accuracy ratings for the narrative, given that most of the informa-
tion presented in it, aside from the 12 pieces of misinformation,
was accurate. After the credibility question, all participants were
asked two additional narrative  usage  questions. The first ques-
tion asked, “Did you use information you remembered from the
audio narrative?” The second question required participants to
rate, “If you used information you remembered from the audio
narrative, how often did you do that?” To answer this ques-
tion, participants were instructed to enter a number between
0–100: “100 means you used information from the audio nar-
rative (instead of the video you saw earlier) to answer every
question. 0 means you never used information from the audio
narrative; instead, you answered all questions based on what
you remembered from the video.” Lastly, participants were
given a short survey on demographics, then debriefed and dis-
missed.
Results  and  Discussion
For both experiments, participants’ responses to the cued
recall questions were coded into the following categories:
video recall (i.e., they produced an answer that matched
the information in the video), misinformation recall (i.e.,
they produced an answer that matched the misinformation),
other recall (i.e., they produced an answer that was neither
correct nor misinformation), and no answer (i.e., participants
left a question blank or responded with something similar
to “I don’t know”). For each experiment, we first present
the results from the final recall test; we then present the
findings from the credibility question and narrative question.
Data from the initial test for both experiments is presented
in Table 1. Bayes factors (B01) in favor of the null hypoth-
esis are reported for effects that did not meet conventional
level of statistical significance (i.e., α  = .05). Data for both
experiments can be found on the Open Science Framework at
https://osf.io/ghdy8/?view only=7b7242a62e0d4c399187ff238
350135b.
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Table 1
Data from the Initial Test
Initial test performance
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Credibility question timing Before After Before After
Response type
Video .47 (.14) .49 (.14) .53 (.15) .50 (.16)
Misinformation .05 (.04) .06 (.05) .06 (.05) .05 (.05)
Other .37 (.12) .33 (.11) .33 (.15) .36 (.15)
No answer .11 (.12) .13 (.13) .09 (.11) .10 (.09)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Credibility question timing refers to whether the credibility question was presented before or after the final test.
Final  test  performance.  We first report data for video
recall, and then we report data for misinformation recall. The
data for “other recall” and “no answer” are shown in Table 2.
Video recall was analyzed using a 2 (initial test: tested, non-
tested) ×  2 (credibility question timing: before final test, after
final test) ×  3 (item type: consistent, misled, neutral) mixed
ANOVA (see left side of Figure 1). Mauchly’s Test of Spheric-
ity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated
for within-subjects comparisons, χ2(5) = .89, p  < .01. Therefore,
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser
estimates of sphericity (ε  = .90). There was a significant main
effect of initial test condition, F(1, 136) = 5.00, p  = .027, η2p =
.04. Specifically, the initially tested participants recalled more
details from the video (M  = .51) than the nontested partic-
ipants (M  = .47)—a testing effect. In addition, there was a
significant main effect of item type, F(1.81, 245.81) = 79.29,
p < .001, η2p =  .37, such that participants recalled more consis-
tent items (M  = .66) than neutral items (M  = .44) and misled items
(M = .37). The interaction between item type and initial test
condition was marginally significant, F(1.81, 245.81) = 2.96,
p  = .059, η2p =  .02, B01 = 1.21. No other effects were significant,
Fs < 1.18, ps > .306, B01s > 5.58.
For misinformation  recall, we focused on data for the mis-
led items. However, for the sake of completeness, participants
did occasionally produce the misinformation spontaneously for
the neutral and consistent items; these means are shown in
Table 2. A 2 (initial test: tested, nontested) ×  2 (credibility ques-
tion timing: before final test, after final test) ANOVA showed a
significant main effect of initial test, F(1, 136) = 18.09, p  < .001,
η2p =  .12. Specifically, participants who completed the initial
test were far more likely to incorrectly recall the misinforma-
tion during the final test (M  = .40) than the nontested participants
(M = .25)—an RES effect (see Figure 2). In addition, there was
a marginal effect of the timing of the credibility assessment,
F(1, 136) = 3.03, p  = .084, η2p =  .02, B01 = 1.51, such that par-
ticipants who received the credibility question before  the final
test were less likely to recall misinformation (M  = .29) than par-
ticipants who received the credibility question after  the final
test (M  = .35). This finding is consistent with our expectation
that the credibility question served as a subtle warning about the
Table 2
Recall Probability as a Function of Testing Condition and Question Type in Experiment 1
Experiment 1: Recall from video
Tested Nontested
Credibility question timing Before After Before After
Consistent questions
Other .20 (.16) .17 (.19) .19 (.20) .26 (.23)
No answer .04 (.07) .05 (.11) .13 (.14) .12 (.17)
Video .71 (.23) .72 (.24) .60 (.20) .60 (.21)
Misinformation .06 (.12) .06 (.12) .08 (.13) .02 (.07)
Misleading questions
Other .19 (.19) .17 (.14) .30 (.15) .30 (.16)
No answer .05 (.09) .05 (.11) .07 (.09) .10 (.09)
Video .40 (.24) .34 (.24) .40 (.14) .33 (.16)
Misinformation .36 (.24) .43 (.24) .23 (.13) .28 (.17)
Neutral questions
Other .39 (.20) .38 (.21) .38 (.17) .35 (.23)
No answer .10 (.14) .07 (.12) .14 (.13) .16 (.17)
Video .45 (.20) .44 (.22) .43 (.20) .43 (.19)
Misinformation .06 (.11) .11 (.14) .05 (.08) .06 (.10)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Credibility question timing refers to whether the credibility question was presented before or after the final test.
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Figure 1. The proportion of video recall as a function of initial test condition (nontested, tested) and credibility question timing (before or after the final test) for
Experiment 1 (left panel) and Experiment 2 (right panel). Error bars represent descriptive 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2. The proportion of misinformation recalled for misled items as a function of initial test condition (nontested, tested) and credibility question timing (before
or after the final test) for Experiment 1 (left panel) and Experiment 2 (right panel). Error bars represent descriptive 95% confidence intervals.
possibility that the narrative might contain inaccuracies, and this
warning helped reduce participants’ susceptibility to misinfor-
mation. Intriguingly, whereas presenting the credibility question
before the final test reduced recall of misinformation, it did not
reduce recall of video details (B01 = 5.59). Together, these data
suggest that the warning did not simply make participants more
conservative in responding (cf. Echterhoff, Groll, & Hirst, 2007);
instead, the warning caused participants to selectively edit their
output by withholding misinformation without sacrificing recall
of the video event details. More important for present purposes,
however, was whether the magnitude of RES differed based on
the timing of the credibility assessment. It was not, as the inter-
action between initial testing and credibility question timing
was not significant, F  < 1, B01 = 4.00, and planned comparisons
showed a similar RES effect regardless of whether the narra-
tive credibility question was administered before, t(71) = 2.86,
p = .006, d  = .67, or after the final test, t(65) = 3.13, p < .003,
d = .76.
In the following, we examined the likelihood of misinforma-
tion recall based on initial test outcome. Specifically, we report
the conditional probability of misinformation recall on the final
test depending upon whether participants had responded during
the initial test with a correct answer, an other (i.e., incorrect)
response, no answer (i.e., don’t know), or spontaneous misin-
formation. Due to insufficient degrees of freedom for responses
in the no-answer (12% of the initial responses) and spontaneous-
misinformation categories (5% of the initial responses), we
conducted inferential statistical analyses for only the initial-
correct (49% of the initial responses) and initial-other items
(34% of the initial responses), but all data along with their
sample size can be seen in Table 3. As expected, when tested
participants had answered a question incorrectly during the ini-
tial test, they were more likely to endorse the misinformation
for that detail (M  = .51, SD  = .40) than when they had answered
the same question with the correct video detail initially (M  = .31,
SD = .34), t(62) = 2.82, p  < .01, d  = 0.36. More impressively, even
when participants could answer a question with a video detail
initially, it did not prevent them from succumbing to misinfor-
mation, as this misinformation recall rate (M  = .31, SD  = .34)
was still numerically, though not significantly, higher than the
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Table 3
The Likelihood of Misinformation Recall Based on Initial Test Outcome for Misled Items in Experiments 1 & 2
Initial-Correct Initial-Misinformation Initial-Other Initial-No Answer
Experiment 1 n = 199 n = 19 n = 14 n = 50
Final-Video recall .59 (.35) .24 (.44) .19 (.31) .06 (.20)
Final-Misinformation recall .31 (.34) .65 (.49) .51 (.40) .43 (.45)
Experiment 2 n = 220 n = 26 n  = 161 n  = 37
Final-Video recall .26 (.25) .08 (.28) .06 (.17) .03 (.12)
Final-Misinformation recall .61 (.28) .79 (.41) .51 (.37) .58 (.46)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
misinformation recall rate of the nontested participants (M  = .25,
SD = .15), t(136) = 1.35, p  = .178, d  = 0.23, B01 = 2.38. This find-
ing illustrates the robust nature of the RES phenomenon, because
the comparison between a conditional probability from the tested
participants to a raw probability from the nontested participants
is confounded by item selection effects. Specifically, we were
comparing a set of easier-to-remember items for the tested par-
ticipants (i.e., items for which participants could recall correctly)
against the full set of items for the nontested participants, so the
tested participants ought to be less susceptible to the influence
of misinformation than the nontested participants. Instead, even
with this item selection effect favoring them, the tested partici-
pants were at least as suggestive as their nontested counterparts.
Credibility ratings  and  narrative  usage.  We now
consider the main question of interest of the present exper-
iment. Did initial testing increase the perceived accuracy
of the post-event narrative? To this end, we conducted a
2 (initial test: tested, nontested) ×  2 (credibility question
timing: before final test, after final test) between-subjects
ANOVA (see Table 4 for means). Neither initial test-
ing nor credibility question timing affected the narrative
accuracy ratings, Fs < 1.28, ps > .260, B01-initial test = 3.05,
B01-credibility assessment = 5.50, B01-interaction = 3.96. Most impor-
tantly, participants perceived the narrative to be similarly
accurate regardless of whether they were previously tested
(M = 70%) or not (M  = 74%; see the left side of Figure 3). Indeed,
if anything, testing had reduced  the perceived accuracy of the
narrative numerically (though not significantly). This finding
is inconsistent with the misinformation acceptance hypothesis.
We also examined whether participants’ credibility ratings were
associated with the likelihood of misinformation recall. If RES is
driven by misinformation acceptance, then the credibility rating
of the narrative should be positively correlated with the misin-
formation recall probability. However, the credibility rating did
not correlate with proportion of misinformation recall r  = .09,
p = .296, B01 = 5.51 (see Figure 4).
In addition to asking participants to rate the credibility of
the narrative, we also asked participants to rate how often they
relied on the narrative when answering the final test questions.
We now examine these narrative usage ratings in a 2 (test-
ing vs. no-testing) ×  2 (credibility question timing) ANOVA.
The main effect of initial test condition was not significant,
such that initial testing failed to increase participants’ reported
usage of the narrative (Mtested = 49%, Mnontested = 43%), F(1,
136) = 1.48, p  = .226, η2p =  .01, B01 = 2.81, nor was there an
interaction between initial testing and credibility question tim-
ing, F(1, 136) = 0.20, p  = .652, η2p =  .001, B01 = 3.71. However,
there was a significant main effect of credibility question timing,
F(1, 136) = 4.48, p = .036, η2p =  .03, such that participants who
received the credibility question before the final test reported
using the narrative as the source of their memory less often
(M = 41%) than those who received the credibility question after
the final test (M  = 51%).
Experiment  2
Method
Participants  and  design.  A total of 158 undergraduate stu-
dents from Iowa State University participated. Data from 12
participants were removed because these participants did not
possess sufficient English proficiency, yielding 146 participants
for analysis. Of the 74 participants in the tested condition, 37
received the credibility question before  the final test and 37
received it after  the final test. Of the 72 nontested participants,
Table 4
Credibility Ratings, Narrative Usage Ratings, and Video Usage Ratings as a Function of Initial Test and Credibility Question Timing
Experiment 1: Recall from video Experiment 2: Recall from narrative
Tested Nontested Tested Nontested
Credibility question timing Before After Before After Before After Before After
Credibility rating 71(17) 70 (17) 74(16) 74 (23) 72(16) 72 (14) 75 (19) 69 (16)
Narrative usage rating 43(21) 54 (27) 40(25) 47 (30) 73(21) 65 (25) 73 (17) 65 (23)
Video usage rating 46(29) 39 (25) 42 (24) 35 (24)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. All ratings are on a 100-point scale. Credibility question timing refers to whether the credibility question was presented
before or after the final test.
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Figure 3. Pirate plots displaying credibility rating as a function of initial test condition for Experiments 1 and 2. The horizontal lines indicate the mean credibility
for each condition and error bars show 95% CIs. Each dot indicates an individual participant rating. Jitter is introduced to disperse the dots horizontally for viewing
purposes. Darker regions represent higher density.
Figure 4. Credibility rating by misinformation recall for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
36 received the credibility question before  the final test and 36
received it after.
Materials  and  procedure.  The materials and procedure in
Experiment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with
the following exceptions. All participants were instructed both
verbally by the experimenter and via written instruction on the
screen, at the time of the final test, to answer all questions based
on what they remembered from the audio  narrative. Because
participants were supposed to report information from the nar-
rative, we added a pair of video usage questions in addition to the
narrative usage questions from Experiment 1. The video usage
questions asked participants to report how often they had used
information from the video to answer the questions (despite the
instructions asking them to answer based on their memory of
the narrative). Following the video usage questions, participants
answered the narrative usage questions that were identical to
those issued in Experiment 1.
Results  and  Discussion
Final  test  performance.  We begin by examining recall of
video details using a 2 (initial test) ×  2 (credibility question
timing) ×  3 (item type) ANOVA. Mauchly’s Test of Spheric-
ity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for
within-subjects comparisons, χ2(5) = .90, p  < .01, so the degrees
of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates
of sphericity (ε  = .92). Similar to Experiment 1, there was a main
effect of initial test condition, F(1, 142) = 6.94, p = .009, η2p =
.05. Even though participants were instructed to recall based
on the narrative, initial testing increased recall of details from
the video (Mtested = .44, Mnontested = .39). In addition, there was
a significant main effect of item type, F(1.86, 259.25) = 274.70,
p < .001, η2p =  .66, with participants recalling more video details
for consistent items (M  = .70) than neutral (M  = .37) and mislead-
ing items (M  = .18; see the right panel of Figure 1 and Table 5
for means). Moreover, the interaction between item type and
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Table 5
Recall Probability as a Function of Testing Condition and Question Type in Experiment 2
Experiment 2: Recall from narrative
Tested Nontested
Credibility question timing Before After Before After
Question and response type
Consistent questions
Other .15 (.15) .15 (.17) .22 (.16) .22 (.19)
No answer .03 (.06) .05 (.11) .11 (.13) .08 (.11)
Video .80 (.20) .74 (.25) .63 (.21) .64 (.27)
Misinformation .02 (.07) .06 (.20) .04 (.07) .06 (.15)
Misleading questions
Other .18 (.18) .21 (.20) .28 (.15) .24 (.14)
No answer .05 (.10) .04 (.10) .10 (.09) .09 (.13)
Video .16 (.15) .15 (.12) .22 (.14) .17 (.11)
Misinformation .62 (.22) .60 (.22) .40 (.18) .49 (.19)
Neutral questions
Other .30 (.19) .38 (.20) .41 (.23) .41 (.21)
No answer .29 (.26) .12 (.16) .23 (.21) .17 (.20)
Video .34 (.19) .46 (23) .31 (.23) .37 (.21)
Misinformation .07 (.11) .04 (.07) .06 (.10) .06 (.09)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Credibility question timing refers to whether the credibility question was presented before or after the final test.
testing condition and the interaction between item type and
credibility question timing were significant, Fs > 4.37, ps < .016,
η2p >  .03. No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.15, ps > .316,
B01s > 3.17.
We now examined misinformation  recall  probabilities for the
misled items in a 2 (initial test) ×  2 (credibility question timing)
ANOVA. Here we found a significant main effect of initial test-
ing, F(1, 142) = 24.86, p < .001, η2p =  .15. Specifically, the tested
participants were more likely to recall misinformation (M  = .61)
than the nontested participants (M  = .44; see the right panel of
Figure 1). This finding is inconsistent with the misinformation
acceptance account of RES, according to which an RES effect
should not be observed in Experiment 2, because asking par-
ticipants to recall details from the narrative made the perceived
accuracy of narrative irrelevant. In contrast, this result is con-
sistent with the TPL account, which suggests that RES occurs
because initial testing facilitates learning of the misinforma-
tion. If this is the case, an RES effect should emerge even when
participants are told to recall details from the narrative. Unlike
Experiment 1, there was no effect of credibility question timing
on misinformation recall, F(1, 142) = 1.34, p  = .249, B01 = 3.34.
Given that participants were told to report what they remember
based on the narrative in Experiment 2, this is not surprising.
The interaction between initial testing and credibility question
timing was not significant, F  = 2.39, p  = .124, B01 = 1.52.
We now examine the probability of misinformation recall
during the final test depending on initial test outcomes. Unlike
Experiment 1, participants demonstrated higher levels of misin-
formation recall when they had provided the correct video detail
to the same question during the initial test (M  = .61, SD  = .28)
than when they had provided an incorrect, other detail during
the initial test (M  = .51, SD  = .37), t(62) = 2.37, p  = .02, d  = 0.30.
This novel finding is particularly intriguing when considered
in the context of the data from Experiment 1, in which par-
ticipants were far less likely to recall misinformation if they
were initially correct (M  = .31, SD  = .34) than when they were
initially incorrect (M  = .51, SD  = .40). Note that the misinforma-
tion recall rate for the initially incorrect items were virtually
identical across the two experiments, but participants were half
as likely to recall misinformation for the initially correct items
in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. This dissociation sug-
gests that when participants were asked to recall details from
the video (as in Experiment 1), they selectively edited their out-
put to avoid reporting misinformation. Further, they were far
more successful at rejecting the misinformation when an exist-
ing, accurate memory was accessible. This finding shows that
taking an initial test did not make the tested participants accept
all misinformation that they have learned as truthful. In fact, par-
ticipants often relied on an existing, correct memory to reject the
misinformation.
Credibility  ratings  and  narrative  usage.  Participants’
perceived accuracy of the narrative was assessed using a 2
(initial test) ×  2 (credibility question timing) ANOVA (see
Table 4 for means). Extending the key finding from Experi-
ment 1, participants believed the narrative to be equally credible
regardless of whether they were initially tested or not (both
Ms = 72%), F  < 1, p  = .969, B01 = 5.62 (see the right side of
Figure 3). As in Experiment 1, there was also no signifi-
cant difference between credibility question timing conditions,
F < 1, ps = .331, B01 = 3.67 and no interaction, F < 1, p  = .336,
B01 = 2.54. Moreover, the probability of misinformation recall
did not correlate with credibility rating (r  = −.08, p = .352,
B01 = 6.29; see Figure 4). Similar to Experiment 1, these results
are inconsistent with the misinformation acceptance hypothesis.
Next, we examined the effect of initial test and credibil-
ity question timing on reported narrative usage in a 2 ×  2
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between-subjects ANOVA. There was no main effect of initial
test condition, F  < 1, p = .961, B01 = 5.41, with the tested and
nontested participants reported virtually identical usage of the
narrative (Ms = 69%). Credibility question timing also did not
affect reported narrative usage, F  < 1, p = .945, B01 = 5.38, such
that participants reported using the narrative to the same degree
regardless of whether the credibility question was administered
before or after the final test (both Ms = 69%, which were sub-
stantially greater than the narrative usage in Experiment 1 at
M = 46%). These results indicate that participants were accu-
rately following the instructions in Experiment 2 by actively
relying on their memory of the narrative during the final test.
There was a crossover interaction, F(1, 130) = 5.36, p  = .022,
η2p =  .04, such that testing increased reported usage of the nar-
rative when the credibility question was presented before the
final test (Mtested = 73%, Mnontested = 64%), but the opposite was
true when the credibility question was presented after the final
test (Mtested = 65%, Mnontested = 73%). We caution against over-
interpreting this interaction because, to our knowledge, it was
not predicted by any theory. We additionally assessed the effect
of initial test and credibility question timing on reported video
usage in a similar 2 ×  2 ANOVA, and neither the main effects
nor the interactions were significant, all Fs < 2.43, ps > .121,
B01s > 1.80.
A  combined  analysis  of  the  data  in  Experiments  1 and
2. We now compare the probability of misinformation recall
between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 in an exploratory anal-
ysis (collapsing across credibility question timing). We feel that
it was appropriate to compare the data in Experiments 1 and 2
for three reasons. First, the experiments were designed simul-
taneously, and their data were collected in consecutive weeks.
Second, the initial test data provided a straightforward test for
whether the participant samples were comparable (because par-
ticipants in the two experiments did the exact same tasks prior
to the final test), and they were (see Table 1), with participants
exhibiting similar initial test performance between Experiment
1 (M  = .48) and Experiment 2 (M  = .51), t(140) = 1.30, p  = .196.
d = .22, B01 = 2.57. We now examine the final test data.
A 2 (initial test: tested, nontested) ×  2 (Experiment: 1, 2)
ANOVA revealed, as expected, substantially greater misinfor-
mation recall in Experiment 2 (M  = .53) than in Experiment
1 (M  = .32), F(1, 282) = 70.24, p  < .001, η2p =  .20. The main
effect of initial testing was also significant, such that the tested
participants recalled more misinformation (M  = .50) than the
nontested participants (M  = .35), F(1, 282) = 42.29, p  < .001,
η2p =  .13 —an RES effect. Most importantly, there was no inter-
action between initial testing and final recall instructions (i.e.,
Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2), F(1, 282) = 0.27, p  = .606,
B01 = 4.80. Indeed, the magnitude of the RES effect was sim-
ilar regardless of whether participants were asked to answer the
final test questions based on their memory of the video (i.e.,
Experiment 1 Mnontested = .25 vs. Mtested = .40, d  = 0.72) or the
narrative (i.e., Experiment 2 Mnontested = .44 vs. Mtested = .61,
d = 0.82). These findings are important for several reasons: First,
the much higher rate of misinformation recall in Experiment 2
relative to Experiment 1 indicates that participants did not sim-
ply misinterpret the final test instructions in Experiment 1 as
telling them to recall information based on the narrative. Sec-
ond, participants clearly remembered far more misinformation
(as shown in Experiment 2) than they reported in Experiment 1.
This shows that they had withheld a substantial proportion of the
misinformation they remembered during the final test (echoing
a point we made earlier). Lastly, the similar magnitude of RES
in the two experiments is inconsistent with the misinformation
acceptance account, which suggests that the RES effect should
not occur in Experiment 2 because the misinformation recall test
made the perceived accuracy of the narrative irrelevant.
Lastly, to gain statistical power, we combined the data from
Experiments 1 and 2 and computed the correlation between
participants’ narrative credibility ratings and the likelihood of
misinformation recall. The result reveals virtually no association
between participants’ belief of the narrative and misinforma-
tion recall, r = .00 [−.12, .12], p  = .998, B01 = 13.51. Once again,
these data failed to provide support of the misinformation accep-
tance account, according to which misinformation recall should
be positively associated with participants’ narrative credibility
ratings.
General  Discussion
In two experiments, we investigated an oft-postulated, but
previously untested, account of the RES effect, which reasons
that prior testing increases people’s susceptibility to subsequent
misinformation because the test increases the likelihood that
participants would discount their own memory and treat the mis-
information as correct. To test this misinformation acceptance
hypothesis, we directly asked participants to assess the accuracy
of the postevent narrative. Moreover, we varied the relevance
of the perceived accuracy of the narrative to what participants
should recall by asking them to answer the final test questions
based on their memory of the video (Experiment 1) or the narra-
tive (Experiment 2). Several important findings emerged, and all
of them were inconsistent with the misinformation acceptance
account. First, testing did not increase participants’ perceived
accuracy of the narrative, even though it increased misinforma-
tion recall. Second, these credibility ratings did not predict the
likelihood of misinformation recall, with the correlation across
the two experiments being essentially zero. Third, the magni-
tude of the RES effect was unaffected by whether participants
answered questions based on their memory of the video (Exper-
iment 1) or the narrative (Experiment 2).
In both experiments, initial testing failed to increase the cred-
ibility of the narrative. This finding is inconsistent with the
most important assumption of the misinformation acceptance
account. Central to the notion of this account is that taking a
memory test for the witnessed event and then receiving informa-
tion pertinent to that test (including information that differs from
one’s recollection of the event) causes one to question his/her
own memories and treat the narrative as providing corrective
feedback. Participants might believe some of the misinformation
be correct regardless of whether they had taken the initial test,
but the misinformation acceptance hypothesis specifies that the
initial test increases participants’ belief in the post-event infor-
mation because treating something as feedback (which should
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only happen for the tested participants) necessitates that infor-
mation to be correct. To the extent that initial testing increases the
likelihood that participants would treat the postevent information
as feedback, it must also increase its credibility. The null effects
on the credibility ratings in both experiments are clearly incon-
sistent with this prediction. Moreover, although testing did not
increase the perceived accuracy of the narrative, it increased sug-
gestibility. This dissociation between narrative credibility and
misinformation recall demonstrates that the perceived accuracy
of the narrative is not a driver of the RES effect, an argument fur-
ther buttressed by the near-zero correlation between the narrative
credibility ratings and misinformation recall probabilities.
Another finding that is at odds with the misinformation
acceptance account is that the RES effect was not weakened
in Experiment 2 relative to Experiment 1. If testing increases
reporting of misinformation because it biases participants to
treat the narrative as correct, then asking both the tested and
nontested participants to recall details from the narrative should
make this bias irrelevant. Further, the RES effect should be
eliminated, because the narrative recall instructions made the
narrative “correct.” Our data, however, showed that the RES
effect remained as strong in Experiment 2 as it was in Experi-
ment 1, extending a pattern of results first reported by Gordon
and Thomas (2017). Further, the narrative recall instructions dra-
matically increased participants’ recall of the misinformation,
which indicates that participants selectively edited their output
in Experiment 1 to avoid reporting misinformation, a conclusion
further buttressed by data from the conditional analysis (i.e., final
test misinformation recall based on the initial test outcomes).
Taken together, our data showed that testing can increase eye-
witness suggestibility without increasing the perceived accuracy
of the postevent information; the data are, however, consistent
with the test-potentiated learning account.
In a theoretical review of the RES literature, Chan et al. (2017)
stated that test-potentiated learning of the misinformation alone
is likely sufficient to produce RES, and the misinformation
acceptance account might provide a supplementary, though
insufficient, explanation. In the present experiments, we found
no support for the idea that initial testing increases participants’
belief in the narrative’s accuracy. More recently, LaPaglia
and Chan (2019) suggested that initial testing might enhance
learning of the misinformation in both a general and a specific
way. A general TPL effect can boost learning of postevent
information based on the four TPL mechanisms described in
the Introduction. This general TPL effect can be observed in
the context of RES when the initial interview (or initial test)
does not include questions that directly target details that will
be contradicted by misinformation later. A prediction borne
out by studies that demonstrated RES while employing free
recall (Wilford, Chan, & Tuhn, 2014), the Cognitive Interview
(LaPaglia, Wilford, Rivard, Chan, & Fisher, 2014), and the
NICHD interview protocol as the initial test (Otgaar, Chan,
Calado, & La Rooy, 2019). In contrast, a specific TPL effect
occurs when a piece of misinformation directly contradicts (or
supplements) a previously queried detail. Being asked specific
questions about a previously experienced event may serve to
highlight these details (e.g., in the plane, what did the terrorist
use to knock out the flight attendant?). When a witness later
encounters information they deem relevant (e.g., a chloroform
rag), the new information might capture the witness’ attention,
thereby enhancing its learning. This specific TPL effect is simi-
lar to how asking students prequestions can enhance learning of
those details later (Carpenter & Toftness, 2017; Hamaker, 1986).
Based on this logic, prior testing might heighten participants’
attention to the misinformation even before  the misleading
detail is presented—participants might pre-allocate attentional
resources to encode the “relevant detail” by anticipating the
forthcoming information based on contextual information (e.g.,
in the air, the terrorist goes to the back of the plane and knocks
the flight attendant unconscious with.  .  .). Consistent with this
notion, when contextual information is made impoverished, the
RES effect is weakened substantially (LaPaglia & Chan, 2019).
Given that it is nearly impossible for investigators to prevent
misinformation from contaminating eyewitness memory, it is
important to examine situations that may exacerbate (or reduce)
eyewitness suggestibility. The ultimate goal of research on RES
is to devise applicable techniques to avoid or reduce its negative
impact, and understanding the mechanisms underlying RES is
crucial for developing these techniques. In the present paper,
we showed that prior testing increases suggestibility because of
a memorial (i.e., prior test potentiates learning of misinforma-
tion), rather than a meta-memorial (i.e., prior testing alters the
perceived credibility of the misinformation relative to one’s own
memory), consequence. Accordingly, interview instructions that
help witnesses leverage the memory-enhancing properties of
retrieval practice (e.g., context recollection, Chan & McDermott,
2007; Jang & Huber, 2008) may be particularly successful at
reducing RES or the misinformation effect (Chan et al., 2012;
Thomas et al., 2010). Since its initial documentation (Chan et al.,
2009), much empirical work has demonstrated the robustness
of the RES effect, and its theoretical mechanisms have been
increasingly elucidated. The time is ripe for researchers to begin
tackling the remaining hard question—how to keep prior testing
from increasing eyewitness suggestibility?
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